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Abstract We present an algorithm and a corresponding MATLAB numerical
toolbox to solve any form of infinite-planning horizon affine linear quadratic open-loop
differential games. By rewriting a specific application into the standard framework one
can use the toolbox to calculate and verify the existence of both the open-loop non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium (equilibria) and cooperative Pareto equilibrium (equi-
libria). In case there is more than one equilibrium for the non-cooperative case, the
toolbox determines all solutions that can be implemented as a feedback strategy. Alter-
natively, the toolbox can apply a number of choice methods in order to discriminate
between multiple equilibria. The user can predefine a set of coalition structures for
which they would like to calculate the non-cooperative Nash solution(s). It is also
possible to specify the relative importance of each player in any coalition structure.
Furthermore, the toolbox offers plotting facilities as well as other options to analyse
the outcome of the game. For instance, it is possible to disaggregate each player’s
total loss into its contributing elements. The toolbox is available as a freeware from
the authors of this paper.
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1 Introduction
Many situations in, for example, economics and management are characterised by
multiple decision makers/players who can enforce decisions that have enduring
consequences. This often invokes coordination problems and so a natural frame-
work to analyze these kinds of problems involves dynamic game theoretical set-
tings. Dynamic game theory tries to arrive at appropriate models describing a
dynamic process affected by different players. Depending on the specific problem
such models can sometimes be used by an individual decision maker to opti-
mise her performance. In other cases it may serve as a starting point to intro-
duce new communication lines which may help to improve upon the outcome of
the current process. Furthermore it is possible to analyze the robustness of play-
ers’ strategies w.r.t. worst-case scenarios. To this end one can introduce “nature”
as an additional player which tries to work against the other decision makers in a
process.
In, for example, policy coordination problems two basic questions usually arise:
(i) whether policies are coordinated and, (ii) which information the participating par-
ties have. Both these points are rather unclear and, therefore, strategies for differ-
ent possible scenarios are calculated and compared with each other. Often, one of
these scenarios is the so-called open-loop scenario. In this open-loop information sce-
nario it is assumed that all players know just the initial state of the process and the
model structure. More specifically, it is assumed that players simultaneously deter-
mine their actions for the whole planning horizon of the process before it starts.
Next they submit their actions to some central authority who then enforces these
plans as binding commitments. In other words, players cannot react on any devi-
ations occurring during the evolution of the process. Obviously, since according
to this scenario the participating parties can not react to each other’s policies, its
economic relevance is mostly rather limited. However, as a benchmark to see how
much parties can gain by playing other strategies, its role is fundamental. Due to its
analytic tractability the open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy is in particular very pop-
ular for problems where the underlying model can be described by a (set of) linear
differential equation(s) and the individual objectives can be approximated by func-
tions that quadratically penalise deviations from some (equilibrium) targets. Exam-
ples and additional references of differential games in economics and management
science can be found e.g. in Dockner et al. (2000), Jørgensen and Zaccour (2003)
and Plasmans et al. (2006).
Under the assumption that the parties have a finite-planning horizon, the linear
quadratic differential game was first modeled and solved in a mathematically rigorous
way by Starr and Ho (1969a,b). A recent exposition (and additional references) on lin-
ear quadratic differential games can be found in Engwerda (2005), whereas Bas¸ar and
Olsder (1999) give a good overview and introduction on dynamic games in general.
In the rest of this paper we will concentrate on the case that the players base
their decisions on a performance criterion that has an infinite-planning horizon. We
will present an algorithm and a corresponding MATLAB numerical toolbox which
solves any form of an infinite-planning horizon affine linear quadratic open-loop
differential game. The software, called LQDG Toolbox, is available as a freeware
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from the authors of this paper.1 By rewriting a specific application into the standard
framework, one can use the toolbox to calculate and verify the existence of both the
open-loop non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (equilibria) and cooperative Pareto equi-
librium (equilibria) of any infinite-planning horizon affine linear quadratic open-loop
differential game. In case there is more than one equilibrium for the non-cooperative
case, the toolbox determines all solutions that can be implemented as a state-feed-
back strategy that is a common assumption in most of the applications.2 Alternatively,
the toolbox can apply a number of choice methods in order to discriminate between
multiple equilibria. For instance, one can choose to report only Pareto-undominated
solutions or only those that are characterised by the lowest combined loss of all the
players. In order to determine the cooperative solution, the user is asked to specify the
relative importance of each player in the cooperative game. Moreover, the user can
predefine a set of coalition structures for which they would like to calculate the non-
cooperative Nash solution(s). Conversely, a coalition structure generator is provided
that automatically creates a whole space of coalition structures for a given number
of players. Furthermore, the toolbox offers plotting facilities as well as other options
to analyze the outcome of the game. For instance, it is possible to disaggregate each
player’s total loss into its contributing elements, which correspond to the quadratic
expressions constituting the player’s loss function.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we will outline the model considered
and present both necessary and sufficient conditions under which there will exist a
unique equilibrium, a number of multiple equilibria or an infinite number of these.
The basic algorithm underlying the numerical toolbox that is presented in Sect. 4 is
discussed in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we will discuss the toolbox that has been constructed
to verify in typical applications whether there will be a unique equilibrium, multiple
equilibria or infinite number of these and how to obtain the solution in the first two
cases. In Sect. 5 we illustrate the use and capabilities of this software with a number
of examples. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Open-Loop Game
In this section we consider two players who control a different set of inputs vi to the
single system described by the structural (simultaneous) form model:
y(t) = P1 p˙(t) + P2 p(t) + P3 y(t) + P41v1(t) + P42v2(t) + P5c, (1)
p˙(t) = P6 p˙(t) + P7 p(t) + P8 y(t) + P91v1(t) + P92v2(t) + P10c, p(0) = p0, (2)
where p is the n-dimensional state of the system; vi is an mi -dimensional (con-
trol) vector that player i, i = 1, 2, can manipulate; y is a b-dimensional vector of
1 A dedicated webpage will be available on-line soon. Mean while contact T. Michalak for obtaining the
software.
2 A state-feedback strategy can be expressed as a linear function of the state variables of the model.
Specifically, if we denote a vector of state variables by x , a state-feedback strategy can be written as Fx,
where F is a real valued function of appropriate dimension.
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endogenous variables; c is a constant (that can be chosen without loss of generality
equal to 1) and p0 is the initial state of the system. We assume that all variables can
be observed at any point of time and that n, mi ≥ 1 and b ≥ 0. Model (1,2) is a
formulation which one frequently encounters in economic modeling. Since we like
to stay close to the original equations formulated by the modeler we choose for this
formulation instead of the standard state-space formulation. Notice that, by choos-
ing P1 = P3 = P6 = P8 = 0, our formulation includes the standard state-space
formulation.





(i1w(t) − f )T Li1(i1w(t) − f ) + 2(i2w(t) − g)T Li2e
}
dt, (3)
where wT (t) := [ p˙T (t) pT (t) yT (t) vT1 (t) vT2 (t)]; f and g are some constant vec-
tors in IR2n+b+m1+m2; e := [1, . . . , 1]T ∈ IR2n+b+m1+m2 and θ is a non-negative
discounting factor. In this formulation the introduction of the i j matrices makes
it possible to deal with several interpretations of the model. For instance by choos-
ing in (3) i1 =i2 and f = g the vector i jw(t) can be interpreted as an out-
put vector of the system player i likes to track towards some specific value.
By choosing a specific column of the i j, j = 1, 2, matrices equal to zero, e.g.,
one can express the fact that some variable is not an important variable for
player i . The matrices Li1 are (without loss of generality) assumed to be sym-
metric. Later on additional assumptions will be made w.r.t. some of the above
matrices.
It is assumed that the players act non-cooperatively and that their information struc-
ture about the game is of the open-loop type. More specifically, we suppose that the
players choose their actions from the following set of actions:
Us =
{
v ∈ L2 | Ji (x0, v) exists in IR ∪ {−∞,∞}, lim
t→∞ x(t) = 0
}
.
The assumption that both players simultaneously use stabilizing controls introduces
the cooperative meta-objective to stabilise the system (see e.g. Engwerda (2005), for
a discussion).
We are looking for the Nash equilibria of this game. That is, for the combinations
of actions of all players which are secure against any attempt by one player to uni-
laterally alter her strategy, or, stated differently, for such sets of actions that if one
player deviates she will only lose. In the literature on dynamic games this problem
is known as the open-loop Nash non-zero-sum linear quadratic differential game and
has been analyzed by several authors (see e.g. Starr and Ho 1969a; Simaan and Cruz
1973; Bas¸ar and Olsder 1999; Abou-Kandil and Bertrand 1986; Feucht 1994; Kremer
2002; Engwerda 2005). To avoid cumbersome notation, we restrict the analyses in
this section to the two-player case. The algorithm is, however, implemented for the
general N -player case.
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To analyze the question under which conditions this game will have a unique equi-
librium we first rewrite the model into the standard framework considered in Engwerda
(2008).3
Assuming that I − P6 is invertible, we have from (2) that
p˙(t) = (I − P6)−1 (P7 p(t) + P8 y(t) + P91v1(t) + P92v2(t) + P10c) . (4)
Substitution of this into (1) and, under the assumption that P¯1 := I −P1(I −P6)−1 P8−
P3 is invertible we can perform a number of elementary operations in order to arrive
at the following reduced form of the model:
p˙(t) = Aˆ p(t) + Bˆ1v1(t) + Bˆ2v2(t) + Eˆ1c, p(0) = p0, (5)
y(t) = Cˆ p(t) + Dˆ1v1(t) + Dˆ2v2(t) + Eˆ2c, (6)
with
Cˆ := P¯−11 (P1(I − P6)−1 P7 + P2), (7)
Dˆ1 := P¯−11 (P1(I − P6)−1 P91 + P41), (8)
Dˆ2 := P¯−11 (P1(I − P6)−1 P92 + P42), (9)
Eˆ2 := P¯−11 (P1(I − P6)−1 P10 + P5), (10)
Aˆ := (I − P6)−1(P8Cˆ + P7), (11)
Bˆ1 := (I − P6)−1(P8 Dˆ1 + P91), (12)
Bˆ2 := (I − P6)−1(P8 Dˆ2 + P92), (13)
Eˆ1 := (I − P6)−1(P8 Eˆ2 + P10). (14)
Next, introduce zT := [pT c vT1 vT2
]
. Substituting p˙ and y from (5) and (6), respec-




Aˆ Eˆ1 Bˆ1 Bˆ2
I 0 0 0
Cˆ Eˆ2 Dˆ1 Dˆ2
0 0 I 0
0 0 0 I
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ z =: N z. (15)






zT (t)(i1N − [0 f 0 0])T Li1(i1N − [0 f 0 0])z(t)
+2zT (t)(i2N − [0 g 0 0])T Li2[0 e 0 0]z(t)
}
dt
3 See also Engwerda (2005, Chap. 7).
123




e−θ t zT (t)
{
(i1N − [0 f 0 0])T Li1(i1N − [0 f 0 0])






e−θ t zT (t)Mi z(t)dt. (16)
Finally, we introduce the extended state variable xT (t) := e− 12 θ t [pT (t) c] and con-
trol variable ui (t) := e− 12 θ tvi (t) so that the state of the system is n¯ = n + 1-dimen-
sional. Now, the game can be rewritten into the standard form. Players minimise:
Ji (u1, u2) :=
∞∫
0






where x(t) is the solution to the linear differential equation:








Aˆ − 12θ I Eˆ1
0 − 12θ
]






Now, factorise Mi as follows:
Mi =:
⎡






with Qi ∈ IRn¯×n¯, R1i ∈ IRmi ×mi , Vi ∈ IRn¯×m1 , Wi ∈ IRn¯×m2 and Ni ∈ IRm1×m2 .
In the rest of the paper we will assume that the matrices Rii are positive definite
and matrix G (see Appendix A for some additional notation including matrix G) is
invertible. In the solution of this game the next algebraic Riccati equations play an
important role:
AT K1 + K1 A − (K1 B1 + V1)R−111
(
BT1 K1 + V T1
)
+ Q1 = 0,
(20)
AT K2 + K2 A − (K2 B2 + W2)R−122
(
BT2 K2 + W T2
)
+ Q2 = 0,
as well as the set of (coupled) algebraic Riccati equations:
0 = A˜T2 P˜ + P˜ A˜ − P˜ BG−1 B˜T P˜ + Q˜, (21)
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or, equivalently:







G−1(B˜T P˜ + Z) + Q.
In particular, the existence of a so-called strongly stabilizing solution of (21) plays
an important role. A solution P˜T =: (P˜T1 , P˜T2 ), with P˜i ∈ IRn¯ , of (21) is called a
strongly stabilizing solution if both σ
(




A˜T2 − P˜ BG−1 B˜T
)
⊂ C−.4







and the solutions of the Riccati equations (21) are well-known (see e.g. Engwerda
2007). This property will also be used to calculate the strongly stabilizing solutions
of (21).
Lemma 1 Let V ⊂ IR3n¯ be an n¯-dimensional invariant subspace of M, and let Xi ∈
IRn¯×n¯, i = 0, 1, 2, be three real matrices such that:
V = im
[







If X0 is invertible, then P˜i := Xi X−10 , i = 1, 2, solves (21) and σ(A − BG−1(Z +
B˜T P˜)) = σ(M|V ). Furthermore, (P˜1, P˜2) is independent of the specific choice of a
basis of V .
When X0 is invertible, the n¯-dimensional invariant subspace V in (23) is called a
graph subspace. The next lemma provides a characterisation of the strongly stabilizing
solution of (21):
Lemma 2 1. The set of algebraic Riccati equations (21) has a strongly stabilizing
solution P˜ if and only if matrix M has an n¯-dimensional stable graph subspace
and M has 2n¯ eigenvalues (counting algebraic multiplicities) with a real part
larger than or equal to zero.
2. If the set of algebraic Riccati equations (21) has a strongly stabilizing solution,
then it is unique.
A proof of both this lemma and the next theorem follow directly from Engwerda
(2008).
Theorem 3 Consider the differential game (17–18) with symmetric Mi , Rii > 0,
invertible matrix G and (A, Bi ) stabilizable.
This game has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial state if and only if
4 σ(H) denotes the spectrum of matrix H ; C− = {λ ∈ C | Re(λ) < 0}.
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1. The set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (21) has a strongly stabilizing
solution, and
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (20) have a (strongly) stabilizing solution.








Z + B˜T P˜
)
˜(t, 0)x0, (24)






Z + B˜T P˜
))
˜(t, 0); ˜(0, 0) = I.
The costs by using the actions (24) for the players are:
xT0 L˜i x0, i = 1, 2, (25)
where, with Acl := A−BG−1
(
Z + B˜T P˜
)











Z + B˜T P˜
)]T + ATcl L˜i + L˜i Acl = 0.
In case the game has more than one equilibrium, generically, there exists an infi-
nite number of equilibria (see Engwerda 2005; Kremer 2002). However, usually for
a finite number of them only, the corresponding actions can be implemented as a
state-feedback strategy (i.e., such strategy that can be written as a linear function of
the state variables of the model like, for instance, in Theorem 3; see also footnote 1
in this paper). In economics it is often argued that actions by policymakers have a
(state-)feedback structure (Taylor rule etc.). For that reason, in case there is more than
one equilibrium, the algorithm will determine only those that can be implemented as
a (state-)feedback rule. From Engwerda (2005) we recall the following result.
Theorem 4 The differential game (17–18), with Mi symmetric, Rii > 0, matrix G
invertible and (A, Bi ) stabilizable, has for every initial state an open-loop Nash set
of equilibrium actions (u∗1, u∗2) which permit a feedback synthesis if and only if
1. The set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (21) has a stabilizing solution, and
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (20) have a stabilizing solution.
Moreover, if P˜ is stabilizing solution of (21), the actions (24) yield an open-loop
Nash equilibrium that can be synthesised as a state feedback. The corresponding costs
are given by (25).
Finally, if one would like to consider the game (17–18) without a constant that, in
particular, allows for a zero discount rate, the state variable should not be extended,
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i.e., xT (t) := e− 12 θ t [pT (t)] is to be used instead of xT (t) := e− 12 θ t [pT (t) c] . The
system in (18) becomes:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + B1u1(t) + B2u2(t), xT (0) = pT0 , (26)
where:
A := Aˆ − 1
2
θ I ; (27)
Bi := Bˆi . (28)
The rest of the above analysis remains valid but with n¯ = n.
3 The Computational Framework
To verify the existence, the number and numerical values of equilibria in the game
(17–18), in the numerical toolbox we use the following algorithm5:
Algorithm 5
Step A1: Verify whether Rii > 0, G is invertible and (A, Bi ) are stabilizable. If this
is not the case, go to Step A6.
Step A2: Calculate the eigenstructure of:
H1 :=
[
A − B1 R−111 V1 −S1
−Q1 −
(






A − B2 R−122 W2 −S2
−Q2 −
(




If Hi , i = 1, 2, has an n¯-dimensional stable graph subspace, then proceed.
Otherwise there is not an equilibrium and go to Step A6.6






If M has s ≥ n¯ stable eigenvalues and u ≤ 2n¯ unstable eigenvalues (count-
ing algebraic multiplicities) then proceed to Step A4. Otherwise, i.e., if
s < n¯, the game has no equilibrium and go to Step A6.
Step A4: The number of equilibria equals the number of different n¯-dimensional sta-
ble invariant graph subspaces of matrix M. In particular this implies that if
5 Notice that we just present those equilibria that can be synthesized as a feedback strategy.
6 With an equilibrium we mean everywhere in the algorithm an equilibrium that can be synthesized as a
state feedback.
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matrix M has eigenvalues that have a geometric multiplicity that is larger
than one, it may happen that there are an infinite number of equilibria (see
e.g. Engwerda 2005, Example 7.11). The algorithm does not elaborate this
case because (i) it is numerically more involved to decide whether an eigen-
value has a geometric multiplicity that is larger than one; (ii) the occurrence
of such cases requires a more detailed inspection of how many different
n¯-dimensional subspaces can be generated; and (iii) generically, the alge-
braic multiplicity of the eigenvalues is one. If s ≥ n¯ and there is at least
one eigenvalue that has an algebraic multiplicity larger than one, then the
algorithm terminates and the user is informed about the possibility that in
the simulation an infinite number of equilibria might occur. It is then up to
the user either to choose some parameters that differ a little bit from the
previous choice (yielding probably a simulation that produces no difficul-
ties), or to take a serious look at the eigenstructure of matrix M and draw
own conclusions. Therefore the algorithm proceeds as follows:
A4.1: If at least one eigenvalue has an algebraic multiplicity larger than
one then the game may have an infinite number of equilibria if s > n¯.
If s = n¯ there probably exists a unique equilibrium, but this has to
be verified using the generalised eigenspace(s). For both cases: go
to Step A6. Otherwise proceed with Step A4.2.
A4.2: All stable eigenvalues have an algebraic multiplicity of one.
A4.2.1: Case s = n¯. Let λs denote the set of all stable eigenvalues
and V˜ s denote the matrix which columns consist of the
eigenvectors corresponding with these stable eigenvalues.
A4.2.1.1: If λs contains no complex eigenvalues then the
image of V˜ s represents the n¯-dimensional sta-
ble invariant subspace of M. Go to Step A5.
A4.2.1.2: If λs contains complex eigenvalues then replace
every pair of conjugate complex eigenvectors
x + iy and x − iy in V˜ s by the real part of
this eigenvector, x , and the imaginary part, y,
respectively (see Example 6 below for further
details). The image of this modified real matrix
represents then the n¯ -dimensional stable invari-
ant subspace of M. Go to Step A5.
A4.2.2: If s > n¯ and:
A4.2.2.1: If there are no complex eigenvalues then:
• Calculate the set Cn¯λs of all s!(s−n¯)!n¯! n¯-element
combinations from s stable eigenvalues;
• For every combination λsi ∈ Cn¯λs : (i) let V˜ si be
the matrix which columns consist of eigenvec-
tors corresponding with eigenvalues from the
set λsi ; (ii) go to Step A5.
A4.2.2.2: If there are complex eigenvalues then:
• Calculate the set Cn¯λs of all s!(s−n¯)!n¯! n¯-element
combinations from s stable eigenvalues that
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have the property where if λsi contains a com-
plex eigenvalue it contains the complex conju-
gate of this eigenvalue too.
• For every such combination λsi ∈ Cn¯λs : (i) let
V˜ si be the matrix constructed in a similar way
as in item A4.2.1.2; (ii) go to Step A5.
StepA5: For every matrix of eigenvectors V˜ si calculate the corresponding M-invari-
ant graph subspace P . To that end proceed as follows:





⎦ = V˜ si .
Verify whether matrix X1 is invertible. If not then ImV˜ si is not a graph
subspace and there is no equilibrium corresponding with this set of
eigenvalues. Choose another matrix V˜ si from the set of potential can-
didates and return to the beginning of the current step (Step A5.1).
If there are no other candidates left, go to Step 6.





:= −G−1(Z + B˜T P˜)x∗(t),






is the open-loop Nash equilibrium
strategy. Here x∗(t) is the solution of the differential equation
x˙(t) = (A − BG−1(Z + B˜T P˜))x(t), x(0) = x0.
∗ The spectrum of the corresponding closed-loop matrix Acl equals
λsi .
∗ Players’ losses can be computed from Ji = pT0 L˜i p0 where L˜i
solves the following Lyapunov equation:












StepA6: End of algorithm.
Step A2 in the above algorithm verifies whether the algebraic Riccati equations
(20) have a stabilizing solution. Of course one can use here MATLAB to verify this.
Concerning the numerical stability of Algorithm 5 we notice that various sugges-
tions have been made in the literature to calculate solutions of Riccati equations in
a numerically reliable way (see e.g. Laub (1979, 1991), Paige and van Loan (1981),
van Dooren (1981), Mehrmann (1991) and Abou-Kandil and Bertrand (1986) for a
more general survey on various types of Riccati equations). These methods can also be
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used to improve the numerical stability of Algorithm 5. In particular, if one considers
the implementation of large scale models one should consult this literature.
As already indicated one can also try to solve the (set of coupled) algebraic Riccati
equations (20) iteratively. In particular, for large scale systems one might hope that
such algorithms will be more efficient. For that reason various iteration schemes have
been suggested in literature (see e.g. Abou-Kandil and Bertrand 1986 or Engwerda
2007). However, since Eq. 20 may admit several solutions, convergence of any game
is quite difficult to obtain under general conditions (see Azevedo-Perdicoúlis and Jank
(2005), for a result on positive solutions). An important problem with these algorithms
is related to the a priori verification of the system’s strong stabilizability. If one does
not want to do it there is an open question how to proceed in case the algorithm
terminates at a non-stabilizing solution.
4 LQDG Toolbox
Next we proceed with an outline of the numerical toolbox. The software verifies the
existence of and, provided that a finite number of equilibria exists, calculates the
outcome of the N -player extension of the game (1–3). The scheme presenting all
the components of the toolbox software is displayed in Fig. 1. The main file, called
LQDGsolver.exe, solves the LQDG which is to be defined in the input. The input file
can be created by the user using an intuitive input interface provided (file TBXinput-
GUI.exe). Alternatively, more proficient users might choose to create the input file
directly (in MATLAB or text formats). LQDGsolver produces the following output
for every coalition structure considered:
• number of equilibria, intermediate matrices constructed during the solution process
(H1, H2, H3 and M) and eigenvalues;
• output actions;
• closed-loop matrices Acl ;
• solution of Lyapunov equations L˜i for every player; and
• loss Ji for every player.
The above output is saved in MATLAB and text formats in a directory that corre-
sponds to the chosen name of the project. The following output files are created:
• PROJECT_NAME_model.txt: text file containing the structural and reduced form
of the dynamic system;
• inputPROJECT_NAME.m: binary MATLAB file containing (processed) input to
the project;
• PROJECT_NAME_validation.txt: text file containing all the information about the
various stages of model validation;
• PROJECT_NAME_output.txt: text file containing all the output produced; and
• outputPROJECT_NAME.m: binary MATLAB file containing all the project’s
output.
The plotting tool is provided that uses the above output to draw the dynamics of
every variable in the model for a chosen coalition structure and equilibrium. Less
advanced users can use a simple output interface (file TBXoutputGUI.exe) that allows
123
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Fig. 1 Scheme of the LQDG Toolbox software
both to edit the toolbox output and to plot the graphs required. Conversely, more
advanced users can directly analyse output of all numerical simulations and create
graphs.
The input for the toolbox is the following model:
y(t) = P1 p˙(t) + P2 p(t) + P3 y(t) +
N∑
i=1
P4ivi (t) + P5, (30)
p˙(t) = P6 p˙(t) + P7 p(t) + P8 y(t) +
N∑
i=1
P9ivi (t) + P10, p(0) = p0, (31)
where p is the n-dimensional state of the system, vi is the mi -dimensional (control)
vector player i (where i = 1, . . . , |N |) can manipulate (with ∑ mi =: m), y is the
b-dimensional vector of endogenous variables and p0 is the initial state of the sys-
tem. Defining z(t) := [p(t) p˙(t) y(t) v(t) c]T , the general form of the performance












φ(1,1),i φ(1,2),i . . . φ(1,2n+b+m+1),i
φ(2,1),i φ(2,2),i . . . φ(2,2n+b+m+1),i
. . . . . . . . . . . .
φ(2n+b+m+1,1,i) φ(2n+b+m+1,2),i . . . φ(2n+b+m+1,2n+b+m+1),i
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
Matrix i can be factorised as follows:
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p2,i p p˙,i py,i pv,i pc,i
 p˙ p,i  p˙2,i  p˙y,i  p˙v,i  p˙c,i
yp,i y p˙,i y2,i yv,i yc,i
vp,i v p˙,i vy,i v2,i vc,i
cp,i c p˙,i cy,i cv,i c2,i
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
with all submatrices .,i defined in Appendix B. Furthermore, in Appendix C it is
shown how, using the appropriate notation, it is possible to define any linear qua-
dratic loss function containing the variables from vector z(t) in the input file (if
the user chooses to create this file by himself not using the provided interface). Of
course, the user is supposed to define only those coefficients φ (i.e., elements of


























































and Mi := T i.
The toolbox also offers the possibility to analyze equilibria for different coa-
lition structures which are formally defined as divisions of all the players in the
game into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions. That is, if, for instance, five players
participate in the game and players 1, 3, 4 and players 2, 5 decide to cooper-
ate, then the toolbox offers the possibility to calculate the open-loop Nash equi-
librium for the resulting two-player game. Obviously the outcome depends on the
relative weight of every players’ performance criterion within the coalition. There-
fore, the user is asked to specify both the coalition structure and these relative
weights.
The number of coalitions structures that can be created from even a small number
of players is a non-trivial issue. More in detail, let 	 denote the set of all possible
coalition structures. The number of all possible coalition structures is a function of
the number of players N and equals the so-called Bell number B|N |. The Bell number
is the number of ways a set of |N | elements can be partitioned into non-empty subsets.
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The following Dobinsky’s formula is one way to compute Bell numbers (Comtet






To simplify the presentation of coalition structures we will use the following short-
hand notation: [C1|C2| . . . |Cm] where C1≤k≤m is represented by the sequence of
players that belong to this coalition. For example: [123|4|56] stands for a coalition
structure where players 1, 2, 3 and players 5, 6 cooperate, respectively and player 4
remains single.
Example 6 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Listing all the possible partitions of the set N into
coalitions, we obtain: [1234], [123|4], [124|3], [134|2], [1|234], [12|3|4], [13|2|4],
[14|2|3], [23|1|4], [24|1|3], [1|2|34], [12|34], [13|24], [14|23], [1|2|3|4]. Indeed,
using simple recursive software to compute Dobinsky’s formula we obtain: B4 = 15.
The number of possible partitions increases exponentially when n increases linearly.
For |N | = 1, 2, . . . , 15, we have the following numbers of coalitions according to
Dobinski’s formula: B1 =1, B2 = 2, B3 = 5, B4 = 15, B5 = 52; B6 =203, B7 =877,
B8=4140;B9 =21147,B10 =115975,B11 =678570,B12 =4213597,B13 =27644437;
B14 = 190899322, and B15 = 1382958545.
It is clear that an examination of all possible coalition structures is not always inter-
esting for the user. Usually, the researcher should choose and restrict her attention to a
subset of coalition structures. In the sequel we will use the notation 	F for the full set
of feasible coalition structures and 	R for a reduced set of relevant feasible coalition
structures.
We will now briefly discuss the various steps the user is confronted with while
using the toolbox.
Step T1: LQDG Toolbox Initialisation To define the LQDG problem the user is sup-
posed to provide a number of compulsory components of the model. As it has been
mentioned before, it is the most convenient to use the interface provided in order to
create the project. The main window of the user interface is shown in Fig. 2. More
proficient users also may create the input file directly in MATLAB or text formats.
Compulsory components of the LQDG problem include:
• the name of the new project;
• number of players, number of state and output variables, whether the model include
constant or not;
• the number of control instruments per player;
• the nonzero Pi and Pi j matrices from the structural form model (30–31);
• the parameters from the performance criterion (32);
• the initial condition p0; and
• the coalition structures to be considered.8
• If the model includes constants, i.e., at least one element of matrices P5 and P10
is non-zero, then it is mandatory to specify a strictly positive discount rate.
7 See Chapter 5 of Plasmans et al. (2006) for more details on this issue.
8 For less than 6 players LQDG Toolbox has predefined sets of all coalition structures so that the user does
not have to define them himself.
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Fig. 2 Main window of the User Input Interface
LQDG Toolbox offers an opportunity to control and verify every important
intermediate step of the solution process as well as the results obtained. The list of all
the available options can be edited in the user interface.
Step T2: Model Validation by LQDG Toolbox Based on the input that is provided in
Step A1, the toolbox verifies various regularity conditions:
1. The invertibility of the matrices I − P3 and I − P7(I − P3)−1 P1 − P5;
2. Positive definiteness of the matrices Rii ;
3. Invertibility of G; and stabilizability of (A, Bi ); and
4. The final validation step that is performed checks whether the algebraic Riccati
equations (20) have a stabilizing solution.
If conditions 1 or 2 fail the toolbox terminates. If conditions 3 and 4 fail then it
means that no equilibrium can be found for the particular coalition structure and the
toolbox considers the next coalition structure in the queue.
Step T3: Calculation of Equilibria In this phase, open-loop Nash equilibria as out-
lined in Theorem 3 are calculated for every specified coalition structure (if such equi-
libria exists).
5 Examples
In this section we illustrate the various steps of the algorithm in three simple exam-
ples. Firstly, we analyze a dynamic duopoly game with sticky prices as considered by
Fershtman and Kamien (1987); secondly, we present the solution of the problem used
in Example 7.10 by Engwerda (2005), where a multiple finite number of equilibria
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emerges; thirdly, we present the solution of the problem used in Example 7.12 by
Engwerda (2005) characterised by complex eigenvalues.
5.1 A Game on Dynamic Duopolistic Competition from Fershtman and Kamien
(1987)
The problem we address here is to find the open-loop Nash equilibria of the game
defined by the revenue functions:










subject to the dynamic constraint:
p˙(t) = s{a − (v1(t) + v2(t)) − p(t)}, p(0) = p0. (35)
Recall that, in this model, θ > 0 denotes the discount rate of future profits and
s ∈ (0,∞) is the adjustment speed parameter of the market price, p(t), towards the
price dictated by the demand function. That is, for larger values of s the market price
adjusts more quickly along the demand function. The cost functions of the compa-
nies are assumed to be C(vi ) := cvvi + 12v2i , where cv ∈ (0, a) is a fixed parameter.
Furthermore, the inverse demand function is assumed to be given by p˜ = a−(v1+v2).
To determine the open-loop equilibrium actions for this game (34–35) we proceed
along the steps outlined in Sect. 3. To that end we first notice that the maximisation
of (34) can be rewritten as the minimisation of −Ji .
Step T1: LQDG Toolbox Initialisation The above maximisation problems can be
rewritten in terms of (32) as:
− min
v1









0 0 −2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 2cv
0 0 0 0 0




















0 0 0 −2 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 2cv
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subject to the dynamics (35), where zT (t) := [p(t) p˙(t) v1(t) v2(t)c].
The model fits into our standard model (30–31) if we specify the various parameters
in the input file of the toolbox as follows:
P1 = P2 = P3 = P4i = P5 = P6 = P8 = 0, P7 = −s, P9i = −s and P10 = c.
Notice that in this example n = m1 = m2 = 1 (and therefore m = 2) and b = 0. In
the performance specification all parameters are zero for both players except the next
ones. For player 1 we have φ(1,3),1 = −2, φ(3,3),1 = 1, and φ(3,5),1 = 2cv , whereas
for player 2 φ(1,4),2 = −2, φ(4,4),2 = 1 and φ(4,5),2 = 2cv .
There are two players in the game. Hence B2 = 2 and 	F = {[1|2], [12]}. As
already mentioned before, the user can either choose to compute the Nash equilibria
for all coalition structures (if such equilibria exist) or only for some elements of 	F
by creating own set of feasible coalition structures 	R . We choose in this example to
calculate analytically the equilibrium for non-cooperative CS [1|2].
Step T2: Model Validation by LQDG Toolbox With this input the toolbox next cal-
culates the standard form (17–18) by considering the new variables:
x1(t) := e− 12 θ t p(t), x2(t) := e− 12 θ t and ui (t) := e− 12 θ tvi (t), i = 1, 2. (36)

















subject to the dynamics
x˙(t) =












where Mi = T i as in (33) with i defined by the user in Step T1.9
Following the notation in Sect. 2 the toolbox generates the following matrices:
A =












, Rii = 1, Ri j = 0 (i 
= j),









, and Ni = 0.
9 Note that y(t) is not taken into account in vector z(t) in the cost criteria in Step T1 as y(t) := 0. Toolbox
automatically extends matrices 1 and 2 by two appropriate zero vectors.
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[−s 0 0 0







−3s − 12θ s(a + 2cv) −s2 0 −s2 0
0 − 12θ 0 0 0 0
1 −cv 2s + 12θ 0 0 0−cv c2v −s(a + cv) 12θ 0 0









Following Sect. 2 the game has, for all p0, a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium if
the following sets of algebraic Riccati equations have a (strongly) stabilizing solution
Pi and Ki , (where i = 1, 2, respectively):
1. The set of coupled Riccati differential equations:
0 = − A˜T2 P − P A˜ + P BG−1 B˜T P − Q˜. (39)
2. The two Riccati equations:
0 = −AT K1 − K1 A + (K1 B1 + V1)R11
(
BT1 K1 + V T1
)
− Q1, (40)
0 = −AT K2 − K2 A + (K2 B2 + W2)R22
(
BT2 K2 + W T2
)
− Q2. (41)
To verify whether, e.g., the algebraic Riccati equation (40) has a stabilizing solution
it is sufficient to check whether the following equation satisfies this property:
(




A − B1 R−111 V T1
)
− K S1 K + Q1 − V1 R−111 V T1 = 0.
(42)
It is easily verified that the Hamiltonian matrix associated with this Riccati equation:
[
A − B1 R−111 V T1 −S1
−Q1 + V1 R−111 V T1 −
(






−2s − 12 θ s(a + cv) −s2 0
0 − 12 θ 0 0
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has a two-dimensional stable graph subspace. Thus, Eq. 40 has a stabilizing solution.
In a similar way one can verify whether (41) has a strongly stabilizing solution. The
procedure to verify whether (39) has a strongly stabilizing solution is presented in the
next step.
Step T3: Calculation of Equilibria Again, following Algorithm 5, the toolbox first
computes the eigenvalues of matrix M to determine whether (42) has a strongly sta-
bilizing solution. These eigenvalues are






17s2 + 10sθ + θ2.
Clearly, matrix M has 2 stable and 4 unstable eigenvalues. Therefore, the only
open-loop Nash equilibrium candidate is obtained by considering the eigenspaces
of M corresponding with the eigenvalues − 12θ and − 12 s − 12λ1. The eigenspaces
corresponding with these eigenvalues are:
T1 = Span{T1} where
T1 = [−(2cvθ + 2cvs + θa + 2sa), −(3θ + 4s), a − cv,
(a − cv)(as − cvs − cvθ)/θ, a − cv, (a − cv)(as − cvs − cvθ)/θ ]T , and
T2 = Span{T2} where
T2 = [−5s − θ − λ1, 0, 2, v, 2, v]T ,
respectively, with v := − (s+θ−λ1)(2sa−3scv−cvθ−cvλ1)4s(2s+θ) . In particular we see that for the
values
{− 12θ,− 12 s − 12λ1
}
the corresponding eigenspace is a graph subspace (i.e.,
V˜ si = Span{T1, T2}).
Since (A, Bi ), where i = 1, 2, are stabilizable, Rii > 0, G is invertible, M has
a 2-dimensional stable graph subspace and 4 unstable eigenvalues, and the algebraic
Riccati equations (39–40) have a stabilizing solution, then all conditions are satisfied


















P˜1 = P˜2 =
[





[−(2cvθ + 2cvs + θa + 2sa) −5s − θ − λ1






, i = 1, 2.
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Using the equilibrium actions:
u∗i (t) = (1 + s f0)x1(t) + (sg0 − cv)x2(t),
the resulting closed-loop system is:
x˙(t) =




Next, we reformulate this result in terms of our original model parameters. From
the above differential equation in x, one obtains the next differential equation for the
equilibrium price path p(t):
p˙(t) = 1
2
(θ − s − λ1)
[




The equilibrium actions are:
v∗i (t) = (1 + s f0)p(t) + sg0 − cv, i = 1, 2.
For the parameters’ values: a = 4, s = 0.1, cv = 1.5, θ = 0.05 and initial condition
p0 = [3] , the toolbox produces the following numerical values (N e non-cooperative
and Ce cooperative equilibrium between players):
1. The equilibrium actions:








































10 These matrices can be used to calculate players’ losses for any given initial condition p0.
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Fig. 3 Control variables in the duopoly game (non-cooperative equilibrium)
4. The optimal losses of players11: J ∗1 (N e)= pT0 L˜1(N e)p0 = J ∗2 (N e)= pT0 L˜2(N e)
p0 = − 12.1836; and J ∗1 (Ce)= pT0 L˜1(Ce)p0 = J ∗2 (Ce)= pT0 L˜∗2(Ce)p0 =− 12.8162.
The toolbox offers a possibility to plot graphs of control, state and output vari-
ables’ dynamics. To plot graphs for a particular equilibrium the toolbox command
plot_graph should be used.12 Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the control variables
for both players (i.e., output of both firms) for the assumed parameter values, whereas
Fig. 4 shows the dynamics of the state variables (i.e., market price as well as a constant,
which is added to the state variables of the system as outlined in Sect. 2).
Furthermore, as it has been already mentioned, the toolbox offers an option to
decompose the loss function of every player into its linear components showing what
is each element’s contribution to the total outcome. It is especially useful in both model
calibration and analysis. When disaggregate losses option is chosen the toolbox creates
a dummy player j for every non-zero element φ(a,b),i of matrix i in the loss function
of player i. Player j ′s matrix  j has φ(a,b), j as the only non-zero entry. Furthermore,
every dummy player is assigned a control variable added to the first state equation of
the system with a coefficient 0 so that it does not have any influence on the system. The
weight of dummy players’ control variables in their loss functions can be defined by
the user using the (advanced) option dummy_control_instrument_multiplier (δ) whose
default value is 1.
In the above example, there are 3 non-zero entries in each i matrix, namely,
φ(1,3),1, φ(3,3),1, and φ(3,5),1 in 1 and φ(1,4),2, φ(4,4),2 and φ(4,5),2 in 2.
Consequently, the toolbox creates 6 dummy players j = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 with:
11 Note that it is not possible to calculate the analytic solution of the corresponding Lyapunov equations,
so it is not possible to calculate the analytic formulas for players’ losses.
12 See the toolbox manual for more details.
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0 0 −2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 δ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and analogous 4,5,6,7 and 8.

















for i = 1, 2 and
− min
v3






e−θ t {−p(t)v1(t) + v23(t)}dt,
13 Note that dummy players which corresponds to elements that involve a constant are always positioned
last.
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− min
v4





















e−θ t {−p(t)v2(t) + v25(t)}dt,
− min
v6





















e−θ t {cvv1(t) + v27(t)}dt,
− min
v8






e−θ t {cvv2(t) + v28(t)}dt,
subject to dynamics:
p˙(t) = s{a − (v1(t) + v2(t)) − p(t)} + 0v3 + · · · + 0v8, p(0) = p0.
Since dummy players have no influence on the system then their optimal strat-
egy is to never use the control instrument as it cannot improve their loss. Conse-
quently, all the obtained results will be the same up to additional dimensions in
losses corresponding to dummy players. These losses can be always interpreted
in terms of the losses of real players. In our example, since v23(t) and v25(t) are







−θ t {−p(t)v2(t)}dt obtained by players 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, J ∗3
and J ∗5 are revenues from sales, whereas J ∗4 + J ∗7 and J ∗6 + J ∗8 are costs func-
tions of both oligopolistic firms. For the parametrisation assumed above the tool-
box produces the following disaggregation of optimal losses in both regimes:
N e Ce Interpretation
J ∗3 −39.4144 −34.2076 Revenue (player 1)
J ∗4 5.3650 3.5454 Cost (player 1)
J ∗5 −39.4144 −34.2076 Revenue (player 2)
J ∗6 5.3650 3.5454 Cost (player 2)
J ∗7 21.8658 17.8460 Cost (player 1)
J ∗8 21.8658 17.8460 Cost (player 2)
which has the following interpretation: while non-cooperating the first/second com-
pany has a revenue with an equilibrium of −J ∗3/5(N e) = 39.4144 while it incurs a
cost of J ∗4/6(N e) + J ∗7/8(N e) = 5.3650 + 21.8658 = 27.2308. Total profit for each
company is −J ∗3/5(N e) − J ∗4/6(N e) − J ∗7/8(N e) = 12.1836 = J ∗1/2(N e). In contrast,
when companies cooperate, their production is much smaller J ∗4/6(Ce) << J ∗4/6(N e)
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but due to a degree of monopolistic power they are able to obtain higher profits:
J ∗1/2(Ce) = 12.8162.
5.2 Example 7.10 of Engwerda (2005) With Multiple Equilibria
A two-player Example 7.10 from Engwerda (2005) can be rewritten using the notation































, R2 = 1, Ri j = 0 (i 





and Ni = 0.
Step T1: LQDG Toolbox Initialisation We can rewrite the above example to fit our
standard model (30–31) by specifying:






Notice that in this example n = m1 = 2, m2 = 1 (and therefore m = 3) and b = 0. In
the performance specification all parameters are zero for both players, except for
φ(1,1),1 = 1;φ(2,2),1 = 0.1; φ(5,5),1 = 2; φ(5,6),1 = −1;φ(6,5),1 = −1; and φ(6,6),1 = 1,
for the first player, and: φ(1,1),2 = 1; φ(2,1),2 = 1; φ(1,2),2 = 1; φ(2,2),2 = 2; and
φ(7,7),2 = 1 for the second player. In this example, we specify the discount rate to
be 0.
Step T2: Model Validation by LQDG Toolbox With this input the toolbox next calcu-
lates the standard form (17–18). Clearly, (i) Rii > 0; (ii) (A, Bi ) is stabilizable; and
(iii) G is invertible (see Appendix A for a definition of G).
Step T3: Calculation of Equilibria Again, we will follow Algorithm 5 for the non-




0.1 0 1 1 1 0
0 2 1 2 0 0
1 0 −0.1 0 0 0
0 0.1 0 −2 0 0
1 1 0 0 −0.1 0




In Step A4 of the algorithm, the toolbox determines the spectrum of M. Numeri-
cal calculations show that M = T J T −1, where J is a diagonal matrix with entries
λ = {2;−2.2073;−1.0584; 2.0637;−0.1648; 1.4668} and
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0 0.2724 −0.6261 −0.0303 −0.1714 0.3326
0 0.7391 0.5368 −0.0167 0.3358 0.0633
0 0.1181 −0.5405 0.0154 −0.6473 −0.2433
0 0.0176 0.0176 0.0262 0.0155 0.0119
0 0.4384 −0.0771 0.0239 0.6207 −0.2897




Let us factorise matrix T into [T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6]. Matrix M has six different eigen-
values, where three of them are negative, i.e., λs = {−2.2073;−1.0584;−0.1648}.
They correspond to eigenvectors T2, T3 and T5. Since no eigenvalue has an
algebraic multiplicity higher than one and there are no complex eigenvalues,




= 3 different equilibrium strategies that permit a feedback synthesis, i.e.,
Cn¯λs = {(−2.2073,−1.0584), (−2.2073,−0.1648), (−1.0584,−0.1648)} or V˜ s ∈
{(T2, T3), (T2, T5), (T3, T5)}. For all three combinations of two eigenvectors V˜ s the
toolbox executes Step A5.




. This matrix is invertible. P1 is an element of P pos and
σ(M|P1) = {−2.2073,−1.0584}. In a similar way it can be verified that P2 :=
Im[T2 T5] and P3 := Im[T3 T5] are also appropriate graph subspaces. On the whole,
all three M-invariant subspaces satisfy all conditions.
As an example, we will calculate the equilibrium strategy that permits a feedback


















where X, Y and Z are 2 × 2 matrices. We obtain then:














The corresponding open-loop Nash strategy is u∗i (t) := −R−1i BTi P˜i eAcl t x0. Here the




. It is easily
verified that the spectrum of this matrix Acl indeed equals {−1.0584,−0.1648}. The
cost for both players in this equilibrium is obtained by solving the corresponding
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Lyapunov equation (29). This gives a cost:











The other two non-cooperative equilibria are:







































J1 0.2476 3.3688 51.8401
J2 0.6473 3.2821 74.2653
The key question is whether it is possible to discriminate between multiple equi-
libria of a particular coalition structure. It is especially important in more complex
games, where a practically intractable number of equilibria can be obtained. One of
the widely accepted solution concepts to discriminate between various equilibria of
a game is Pareto-domination. An equilibrium is said to be Pareto-dominated if it is
possible to find another equilibrium in which all the players in the game will not be
worse off and at least one of them will be better off. If option discriminate between
equilibria using Pareto domination is chosen, the toolbox is going to report a list of
Pareto-undominated equilibria. In the above case, it is clear that in the non-cooperative
regime equilibrium N e1 dominates the other two as J1(N
e
1 ) < J1(N
e
2 ) < J1(N
e
3 ) and
at the same time J2(N e1 ) < J2(N
e
2 ) < J2(N
e
3 ). Consequently, apart from all the equi-
libria, the toolbox is going to report also a set of Pareto-undominated equilibria which
consists of N e1 .
The particular advantage of the Pareto concept is based on the fact that it is in the
interest of all the players to play only Pareto -undominated equilibria. However, the
downside is that there can be a whole spectrum of them. Because of this, we propose
another two ways to discriminate between multiple equilibria. The first method is based
on the concept of so called social optimum, i.e., such an equilibrium is chosen that mini-
mises the sum of all the players’ losses, or, in our two-player game: J1(N e1 )+ J2(N e1 ).
In our example J1(N e1 ) + J2(N e1 ) < J1(N e2 ) + J2(N e2 ) < J1(N e3 ) + J2(N e3 ) so the
first equilibrium is chosen when this option is on. The other method we propose to
discriminate between multiple equilibria refers to the adjustment speed of the equilib-
rium closed-loop system towards its long-term equilibrium, measured by the smallest
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absolute value of the eigenvalues of the Acl matrix that are located in the left half of
the complex plane. In our example:




, λs(N e1 ) = {−1.0584, −2.2073};




, λs(N e2 ) = {−0.1648, −2.2073}; and




, λs(N e3 ) = {−1.0584, −0.1648}.
Consequently, the toolbox will choose the equilibrium such that their graph sub-
space consists of eigenvector corresponding to −1.0584,−2.2073, i.e., N e1 .
5.3 Example 7.12 of Engwerda (2005) With Complex Eigenvalues
A two-player Example 7.12 from Engwerda (2005) can be rewritten in terms of nota-















, Q2 = 12
[













1 − 110− 110 34
]
,





, and Ni = 0.
Step T1: LQDG Toolbox Initialisation We can rewrite the above example to fit our
standard model (30–31) by specifying:






Notice that in this example n = m1 = m2 = 2 (and therefore m = 4) and b = 0.
In the performance specification, all parameters are zero for both players, except for
φ(1,1),1 = 12 , φ(1,2),1 = 12 , φ(2,1),1 = 12 , φ(2,2),1 = 32 , φ(5,5),1 = r11, φ(5,6),1 =
r12, φ(6,5),1 = r21, φ(6,6),1 = r22, φ(1,1),2 = 1, φ(1,2),2 = − 718 , φ(2,1),2 =























1 − 110− 110 34
])−1
,
for the first and second players, respectively. Also in this example, we specify the
discount rate to be 0.
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Step T2: Model Validation by LQDG Toolbox With this input, the toolbox next cal-
culates the standard form (17–18) and checks that both Qi and Ri are positive definite,
(A, Bi ) are stabilizable and G is invertible.
Step T3: Calculation of Equilibria Again, we will follow Algorithm 5 for the non-




0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 −0.0389 0.5000 −0.0500
0.0000 0.2500 −0.0389 0.5000 −0.0500 0.3750
0.5000 0.5000 −0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.5000 1.5000 0.0000 −0.2500 0.0000 0.0000
1.0000 −0.3889 0.0000 0.0000 −0.5000 0.0000




In Step A4 of the algorithm the toolbox determines the spectrum of M . Numeri-
cal calculations show that M = T J T −1, where J is a diagonal matrix with entries




0.1358 + 0.4406i 0.1358 − 0.4406i −0.0045 −0.0002 0.3848 0.0003
0.4499 − 0.1379i 0.4499 + 0.1379i 0.0005 0.0026 0.0134 −0.3767
0.1966 + 0.0979i 0.1966 − 0.0979i −0.0080 0.7063 −0.3982 0.3764
0.5940 0.5940 0.5979 −0.0156 −0.2833 0.7531
−0.0211 + 0.3297i −0.0211 − 0.3297i −0.0189 −0.7077 −0.7593 −0.2935




Matrix M has two (complex) eigenvalues with a negative real part. Let x be the
real part of the eigenvector corresponding with the eigenvalue −1.0004+0.0227i and
y the imaginary part of this eigenvector
xT := [0.1358, 0.4499, 0.1966, 0.5940, −0.0211, 0.1341] and
yT := [0.4406, −0.1379, 0.0979, 0, 0.3279, −0.1964].
The invariant subspace corresponding with eigenvalues {−1.0004 + 0.0227i;
−1.0004 − 0.0227i} is S =Im[x y]. According to Sect. 2, the unique equilibrium
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The eigenvalues of this matrix are {−1.0004 + 0.0227i;−1.0004 − 0.0227i}. The
corresponding equilibrium costs are



















In this paper we considered a dynamic linear affine structural form model that is
affected by different players who all like to minimise their own performance criterion
that is a quadratic affine function of the variables occurring in the model. The costs
are assumed to be discounted over time and the considered planning horizon by the
players is assumed to be infinite. Under the assumption that in the minimisation of
their performance the players do not cooperate, we presented both necessary and suffi-
cient conditions under which this problem has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium, a
multiple but finite number of equilibria and or an infinite number of equilibria. A com-
putational framework was provided for how one can numerically solve the problem.
The algorithm has been implemented in a form of a numerical toolbox available on
the internet. Users, starting from the structural model, can calculate for their specific
application the equilibrium strategies and involved cost (if they exist). The toolbox
also provides the possibility to calculate for different coalition structures whether the
corresponding game will have an open-loop Nash solution. For that purpose the user
has to define which coalition structures they like to analyze and what the relative
importance is of each player within a certain coalition. We demonstrated both theoret-
ically and numerically in a worked example on dynamic duopolistic competition the
use of the toolbox.
LQDG Toolbox is implemented in MATLAB. In particular, it uses some standard
functions of MATLAB to calculate the eigenstructure of a (|N |n¯) × (|N |n¯) matrix,
where |N | is the number of involved players and n¯ is the state dimension of the model.
Since no additional efforts are taken to calculate this eigenstructure in a numerically
efficient way, the practical use of the current toolbox is limited to some extent. This is
because for either a large number of players and/or a large state dimension, the accu-
racy and efficiency is restricted by that of the implemented MATLAB functions. So
for large N and/or n¯ the user should look for an own code to implement the algorithm.
Another way one might choose to calculate the equilibrium strategies is by using iter-
ative algorithms. In the literature a number of iterative schemes have been suggested
(see e.g. Engwerda 2007). A disadvantage of these schemes is that on the one hand
they do not provide an answer to the question whether the game will have a unique
equilibrium. On the other hand these schemes may converge without providing the
appropriate equilibrium strategy. If this happens one is stuck with the question how to
proceed.
For the corresponding problem with a finite planning horizon, at least from a the-
oretical point, it is clear under which conditions there exists a unique equilibrium
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(see e.g. Engwerda 2005). From a computational point it is also clear how one can
calculate this equilibrium. Either one can solve the involved set of nonlinear differen-
tial two-point boundary-value equations directly using standard MATLAB functions.
Another possibility is to transform the involved set of Riccati differential equations
(in the spirit of Reid (1972)) to a set of linear differential equations and then solve
this set first (see e.g. Tabak 1975; Engwerda 2007). Since the calculations require
the numerical solution of a set of (nonlinear) differential equations the dimension of
the games for which one can still calculate the equilibrium actions (using standard
MATLAB functions) without problems is usually smaller than in the infinite horizon
case.
In the literature, also different equilibrium concepts have been studied for games
considered above. Probably the most well-known is the feedback Nash concept. Unfor-
tunately, for this case there are no general conditions known, except for the scalar case,
i.e., n¯ = 1 (see e.g. Engwerda 2005) under which the game has a unique feedback
Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we would like to mention that for discrete time systems much work has
been done by Neck et al. in the development of the numerical software OPTGAME
for the calculation of Nash equilibria in (non-)linear systems in case the performances
of players are quadratic (see e.g. Neck et al. 2001).
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Appendix A: Notation
The following shorthand notation is used:
Si := Bi R−1i i BTi , G :=
[ [0 I 0] M1
[0 0 I ] M2
]⎡





































[ [0 I 0] M1
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Zi := [I 0 0]Mi
⎡
⎣ 0 0I 0
0 I
⎤
⎦ = [Vi , Wi ], i = 1, 2,










, S˜i := BG−1 B˜Ti ,











⎣ A 0 0−Q1 −AT 0
−Q2 0 −AT
⎤





⎦ and H3 := [ Z , B˜T1 , B˜T2
]
.
Matrices H1, H2, H3 and G to construct the M are stored in the LQDG Toolbox output
file.




φ(1,1),i p21 φ(1,2),i p1 p2 . . . φ(1,n),i p1 pn
φ(2,1),i p2 p1 φ(2,2),i p22 . . . φ(2,n),i p2 pn
. . . . . . . . . . . .
φ(n,1),i pn p1 φ(n,2),i pn p2 . . . φ(n,n),i p2n
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
 p˙ p,i :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
φ(n+1,1),i p˙1 p1 φ(n+1,2),i p˙1 p2 . . . φ(n+1,n),i p˙1 pn
φ(n+2,1),i p˙2 p1 φ(n+2,2),i p˙2 p2 . . . φ(n+2,n),i p˙2 pn
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(2n+1,1),i y1 p1 φ(2n+1,2),i y1 p2 . . . φ(2n+1,n),i y1 pn
φ(2n+2,1),i y2 p1 φ(2n+2,2),i y2 p2 . . . φ(2n+2,n),i y2 pn
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(2n+b+1,1),iv1 p1 φ(2n+b+1,2),iv1 p2 . . . φ(2n+b+1,n),iv1 pn
φ(2n+b+2,1),iv2 p1 φ(2n+b+2,2),iv2 p2 . . . φ(2n+b+2,n),iv2 pn
. . . . . . . . . . . .













φ(1,n+1),i p1 p˙1 φ(1,n+2),i p1 p˙2 . . . φ(1,n+n),i p1 p˙n
φ(2,n+1),i p2 p˙1 φ(2,n+2),i p2 p˙2 . . . φ(2,n+n),i p2 p˙n
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(n+1,n+1),i p˙21 φ(n+1,n+2),i p˙1 p˙2 . . . φ(n+1,n+n),i p˙1 p˙n
φ(n+2,n+1),i p˙2 p˙1 φ(n+2,n+2),i p˙22 . . . φ(n+2,n+n),i p˙1 p˙n
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(2n+1,1,i)y1 p˙1 φ(2n+1,2,i)y1 p˙2 . . . φ(2n+1,n),i y1 p˙n
φ(2n+2,1,i)y2 p˙1 φ(2n+2,2,i)y2 p˙2 . . . φ(2n+2,n),i y2 p˙n
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(2n+b+1,n+1,i)v1 p˙1 φ(2n+b+1,n+2,i)v1 p˙2 . . . φ(2n+b+1,n+n),iv1 p˙n
φ(2n+b+2,n+1,i)v2 p˙1 φ(2n+b+2,n+2,i)v2 p˙2 . . . φ(2n+b+2,n+n),iv2 p˙n
. . . . . . . . . . . .











φ(1,2n+1),i p1 y1 φ(1,2n+2),i p1 y2 . . . φ(1,2n+b),i p1 yb
φ(2,2n+1),i p2 y1 φ(2,2n+2),i p2 y2 . . . φ(2,2n+b),i p2 yb
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(n+1,2n+1),i p˙1 y1 φ(n+1,2n+2),i p˙1 y2 . . . φ(n+1,2n+b),i p˙1 yb
φ(n+2,2n+1),i p˙2 y1 φ(n+2,2n+2),i p˙2 y2 . . . φ(n+2,2n+b),i p˙2 yb
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(2n+1,2n+1),i y21 φ(2n+1,2n+2),i y1 y2 . . . φ(2n+1,2n+b),i y1 yb
φ(2n+2,2n+1),i y2 y1 φ(2n+2,n+2),i y22 . . . φ(2n+2,2n+b),i y2 yb
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(2n+b+1,2n+1,i)v1 y1 φ(2n+b+1,2n+2,i)v1 y2 . . . φ(2n+b+1,2n+b),iv1 yb
φ(2n+b+2,2n+1,i)v2 y1 φ(2n+b+2,2n+2,i)v2 y2 . . . φ(2n+b+2,2n+b),iv2 yb
. . . . . . . . . . . .











φ(1,2n+b+1),i p1v1 φ(1,2n+b+2),i p1v2 . . . φ(1,2n+b+m),i p1vm
φ(2,2n+b+1),i p2v1 φ(2,2n+b+2),i p2v2 . . . φ(2,2n+b+m),i p2vm
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(n+1,2n+b+1),i p˙1v1 φ(n+1,2n+b+2),i p˙1v2 . . . φ(n+1,2n+b+m),i p˙1vm
φ(n+2,2n+b+1),i p˙2v1 φ(n+2,2n+b+2),i p˙2v2 . . . φ(n+2,2n+b+m),i p˙2vm
. . . . . . . . . . . .








φ(2n+1,2n+b+1),i y1v1 φ(2n+1,2n+b+2),i y1v2 . . . φ(2n+1,2n+b+m),i y1vm
φ(2n+2,2n+b+1),i y2v1 φ(2n+2,2n+b+2),i y2v2 . . . φ(2n+2,2n+b+m),i y2vm
. . . . . . . . . . . .






φ(2n+b+1,2n+b+1),iv21 φ(2n+b+1,2n+b+2),iv1v2 . . . φ(2n+b+1,2n+b+m),iv1vm
φ(2n+b+2,2n+b+1),iv2v1 φ(2n+b+2,2n+b+2),iv2v2 . . . φ(2n+b+2,2n+b+m),iv2vm
. . . . . . . . . . . .















































Appendix C: Defining Linear Quadratic Loss Function in the Input File
If the user chooses to create by themselves the input file, the linear-quadratic loss of
every player in the game should be defined as follows. According to the definition of
vector z(t), i.e., z(t) := [p(t) p˙(t) y(t) v(t) c]T , coefficient φ (in the loss of player i)
that regards:
(i) variable p1≤k≤n has an index (k, .), i , i.e. , φ(k,.),i ;
(ii) variable p˙1≤k≤n has an index (n + k, .), i , i.e., φ(n+k,.),i ;
(iii) variable y1≤k≤b has an index (2n + k, .), i , i.e., φ(2n+k,.),i ;
(iv) variable v1≤k≤m has an index (2n + b + k, .), i , i.e., φ(2n+b+k,.),i ; and
(v) variable c has an index (2n + b + m + 1, .), i , i.e., φ(2n+b+m+1,.),i .
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and set:
φ(1,1),i = 5, φ(2,6),i = −12 , φ(3,n+3),i = α1, φ(n+2,n+3),i = α1, φ(3,2n+b+2),i = 1,
φ(2n+b+i,2n+b+2),i = 2, φ(2n+b+i,2n+b+i),i =
√
3, and φ(2n+b+m+1,2n+b+m+1),i = 4.
Of course, instead of φ(2,6),i = − 12 one might as well set φ(6,2),i = − 12 or φ(2,6),i =
− 14 and φ(6,2),i = − 14 or any other linear combination that sums up to − 12 .
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